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
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17 May 1965

DIA Intelligence Bulletin 95-65

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


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17 May 1965

## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Bulletin 95-65

## INDEX AND PRECIS

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Late developments are reported. p. 1

25X6

ECUADOR: Guayaquil strike may be settled soon. p. 3

BOLIVIA: Leftwing mine-worker leader removed, making way for greater tin mine control. p. 4

USSR: Moscow parade weapons are analyzed. p. 5

USSR: A KIROV-class cruiser has entered the Mediterranean, probably to direct the operations of other naval units there. p. 11

CONGO (B): National Revolutionary Movement Representatives to make first contact with Moscow. p. 11

CONGO (L): President Kasavubu orders establishment of industrial police. p. 13

GHANA: Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference attacks US. p. 14

ARAB WORLD: Diplomatic relations are severed with West Germany. p. 15

ALGERIA: Algiers receives materiel resembling Soviet missile equipment. p. 15

i

**SECRET**

25X1

SECRET

25X1

[Redacted]

25X6

PAKISTAN: Authority to challenge overflights by India may bring trouble. p. 18

[Redacted]

2

LIBYA: Egyptian saboteurs may have blown up several oil wells. p. 20

CYPRUS: Developments are discussed. p. 21

25

[Redacted]

NOTES: p. 24

DAHOMY: Rumors of imminent overthrow.

SUDAN: Strike to be called.

[Redacted]

USSR: Stalin image persists.

GHANA/USSR: Kosygin visit.

YUGOSLAVIA/  
USSR: Naval force movements.

FAR EAST/ASIA SECTION

p. F-1

REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM: Incidents of the week are discussed.

p. F-2

[Redacted]

25X

ii

SECRET

[Redacted]

25X1

**SECRET**

25X1

**NORTH VIET-  
NAM:**

[REDACTED]

Intensive reconnaissance of DRV lines of communications continues. p. F-6

Photography shows MIGs at Phuc Yen. p. F-7

[REDACTED]

**REPUBLIC OF  
VIET-NAM:**

Viet Cong have fragmentation mine similar to US type. p. F-9

**JAPAN:**

A leftwing labor federation is re-considering its plans to aid North Viet-Nam. p. F-10

**REPUBLIC OF  
KOREA:**

Coup threat erased. p. F-10

**LAOS:**

Military developments. p. F-11

**INDONESIA:**

Subandrio's disfavor may cause reshuffle in power grouping. p. F-12

First Deputy Premier Subandrio goes to Tokyo on 19 May for two days of talks on how to end the dispute with Malaysia. p. F-13

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**SUPPLEMENT:**

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ARAB MILITARY PLANNING


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Santo Domingo

DIA-151C 17 MAY 65

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Dominican Situation as of 5:00 PM, 16 May

The Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) continued its cleanup operation in the northwestern industrial area of Santo Domingo of rebels through Sunday. It is being carried out by 250 of Gen Wessin y Wessin's Armed Forces Training Center (AFTC) troops with two tanks and three half-tracks, and 500 or more troops from the transportation battalion barracks with four tanks. The AFTC contingent took back roads from San Isidro on 14 May to seize control of the Paynado Bridge and the approaches to it on Avenida Maximo Gomez. Troops from the transportation battalion barracks, spearheaded by tanks, had moved eastward on 14 May and by nightfall had cleared the area as far as Maximo Gomez and north of Avenida John F. Kennedy. Police units moved in behind the regular troops to hold the cleared area and disarm the inhabitants.

The push was resumed on the 16th with the objective of reaching Calle Maria Montos, the eastern boundary of the rebel stronghold in the cemetery as well as of the industrial sector. By about 3:00 PM EDT, the GNR commander reported that they had reached their objective, although a few rebel pockets remained in the northern part of the area. About 240 rebels, equipped with rifles and machine guns, were captured that morning trying to cross the Peynado Bridge, apparently in an effort to escape to the north, and as many as 300 prisoners may have been taken the day before. The loyalists report no fatalities. If they can hold this area, it will permit many industries and commercial establishments to resume operations, which would represent an important political gain for the GNR.

Increased rebel sniping at US forces, particularly at 82d Airborne units, has followed loyalist pressure on the rebels in northwestern Santo Domingo. Some 41 cease-fire violations were reported on 15 May, bringing the total to about 175. US battle casualties to date are 17 deaths and 89 wounded.

While Radio Santo Domingo (RSD), the dissidents' major propaganda weapon, has been off the air most of the time since Friday afternoon and its occasional broadcasts

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 1

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25X1





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25X1

on Sunday were weak, the GNR has been using its station to publicize its victories and report large-scale rebel surrenders. The GNR has also started publishing some newspapers in an effort to present its side of the picture.

The food situation has improved throughout most of the country, except in northern Santo Domingo, but vegetable oil and, in some areas, rice are still very short. The GNR's weekend cleanup action should let the vegetable oil factory, the major source of cooking oil, start operations. Payments to government employees began on 15 May.

The interior is quiet. The GNR has established more effective roadblocks between Santo Domingo and Santiago to the north and San Pedro and La Romana to the east, all major potential trouble spots. Two Spanish Communists were arrested in La Romana Saturday for inciting the youth. Unease persisted in the Puerto Plata area on the north coast where food and gasoline shortages have been acute. Reports from the Haitian border area indicate that that area remains calm and firmly under GNR control.

The injection of the UN into the Dominican situation has somewhat demoralized the OAS commission, which already felt somewhat dejected because of its cavalier treatment by the Caamano "government." The UN advance group, headed by Indian Gen Rikhye, arrived in Santo Domingo on 15 May. Jose Antonio Mayobre, a Venezuelan who has been Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, has been named U Thant's special representative and is due in on Monday. Brazilian Lt Col Francisco Boaventura Costa Cavalcanti will be military adviser to Mayobre and may counterbalance the latter, who is suspected of pro-Bosch, if not pro-rebel, sympathies.

The Latin American Military Force, already represented in the Dominican Republic by Honduran, Costa Rican, and Nicaraguan contingents, may be strengthened by Brazilian and possibly other contingents this week. The Brazilian National Security Council approved the proposal to send some 800 troops to Santo Domingo on 16 May, and Congress is expected to do so early this week. The Guatemalan contingent was to be ready to leave on the 16th if Peralta gave the word. [REDACTED]

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**SOURCE:** VARIOUS

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2


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Ecuador's Guayaquil Becomes Calmer

The strike in Guayaquil has not been officially resolved, but negotiations between the ruling junta and the local business community have apparently provided a basis for settlement within the next several days.

The city seems to have calmed down considerably, and local newspapers are now publishing and radio stations resuming broadcasts. Security patrols have allegedly been reduced substantially, and no serious casualties have been reported.

Difficulties could still arise in achieving a final settlement, but the junta's firm action in meeting the challenge posed by the strike may in the end enhance its national prestige. Despite many rumors of discord within the junta and the armed forces, they have worked together harmoniously in maintaining control of the situation. [REDACTED]

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 3

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Bolivian Government Move Against Tin Workers Apparently Under Way

The deportation of Juan Lechin, leftist mine-workers' leader and an ex-Vice President of Bolivia, to Paraguay on 15 May may be the first step in the planned government drive to gain greater control over the nation's tin miners. Lechin was accused of subversion and dual citizenship.

The Bolivian Mine Workers' Confederation, of which Lechin is the leader, has called for a general strike on 17 May to protest his exile. Demonstrations by the Communist Youth of Bolivia, reportedly set for 18 and 19 May, might now be timed to coincide with any mine workers' rallies.

The semiautonomous position of the tin miners, who have their own militia, has long been a deterrent to greater national unity. The government has placed security forces on a full state of alert and apparently feels confident it can meet any threats which might arise. [REDACTED]

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SOURCE: VARIOUS

17 May 65



DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 4

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# NEW POSSIBLE MEDIUM RANGE MOBILE MISSILE



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DIA-151C 17 MAY 65

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More On Moscow Parade Weapons Analysis

Continuing analysis of the 9 May Moscow Parade photographs is refining initially published data and providing additional assessments of weapons' capabilities.

New Possible Medium-Range Mobile Missile.

The new mobile missile system contained in a pod and mounted on a large tracked transporter-erector-launcher may have a one- or two-stage solid-propellant configuration. The actual configuration and size is not known since the missile itself was not visible. The container is about 40 feet long and has a rear cover some five feet in diameter through which four nozzles protrude.

Performance analysis shows range capabilities between 300 and 800 nautical miles with a 1,500 to 3,000-lb payload for a two-stage design, the one considered more reasonable. A single-stage configuration would have a range of less than 300 nautical miles.

This system may be the one that has been tested on the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range since March 1964.

The pod probably provides environmental control or insulated protection for the solid-propellant missile. The missile is apparently erected to the vertical position behind the tracked vehicle and rests on the blast deflector which is at road level. Before ignition, the clamshell lid of the pod is opened by pneumatically operated latches and a hydraulically operated cylinder; the pod is then lowered to clear the missile lift-off path.

New Three-Stage Solid Propellant ICBM.

The new three-stage solid propellant ICBM is similar to the US MINUTEMAN in size and design.

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17 May 65



DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 5

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# NEW THREE-STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT ICBM



DIA-1SIC 17 MAY 65

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It is about 65.1 feet long and has a gross weight of around 90,000 pounds. It is considered capable of delivering a payload of about 800 pounds to a range in excess of 5,000 nautical miles.

The missile-guidance system is probably located in the two-foot cylindrical section located immediately behind the reentry vehicle and probably uses an autonomous or radio-inertial technique. Vehicle thrust vector control is probably attained through the use of swivel nozzles on each stage. The accuracy of the system has not yet been estimated.

The propulsion system may use a cast, double-base solid propellant. All three stages have four nozzles which are visible, and all have similarly designed motor casings which appear to be fabricated from heavy sheet metal. The motors are probably ignited by a device which is clearly visible on the top dome of the motor casings for the first two stages. No thrust-termination devices are visible.

The sphere cone reentry vehicle (RV) on the parade missile appears to be a cover, mockup, or parade decoration. Its surface is rippled with dents, and it has a crimped lower edge. If the sphere cone depicts the RV's actual shape, the base diameter is about 3.4 feet and the length about 5.1 feet. A compatible warhead weight would be in the 500- to 700-lb class.

The three stages are connected by a lattice-type structure fabricated of metal tubing and arranged in a triangular pattern which exposes the interstage areas. The third stage has two conduits running from the nozzle compartments to the 2.2-foot-long cylindrical section, probably for guidance and associated instrumentation cables. Access panels are located on the flared sections covering the nozzle compartments of all three stages and on the probable instrumentation compartment at the top of the missile.

The transporter is a six-wheel special-purpose trailer capable of carrying the missile with or

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17 May 65



DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 6

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# LARGE UNIDENTIFIED THREE-STAGE VEHICLE



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without the reentry vehicle and appears to have been designed specifically for this weapon. The maximum weight of the loaded transporter can range from 100,000 to 125,000 pounds. A tow speed of 30 miles per hour is assessed. The transporter does not appear to serve as an erector.

#### Large Unidentified Three-Stage Vehicle

The large three-stage vehicle has an over-all length of about 115 feet. Diameters of the first and second stages are about 8.9 feet with a flare at the base of the first stage to about 9.9 feet. The length of the third stage is about 22 feet with a base diameter of about 7.8 feet.

The first and second stages use liquid bipropellants; the third stage cannot be evaluated from available data. Analysis shows the vehicle is not compatible with known characteristics of the boosters used to launch VOSTOK and VOSKHOD capsules, but it could be used in a weapons system or in a space-vehicle launch system.

The third stage is not the type of body normally associated with a reentry vehicle. There is a small sphere-cone section on the front of this stage which could be, or could contain, the reentry vehicle. If this is a three-stage ICBM and the small sphere cone segment is the reentry vehicle, the payload could be on the order of 3,500 pounds. The other alternative is that the third stage is not intended to reenter and is a nonrecoverable vehicle with or without a propulsion system. This stage may have a single-chamber rocket engine surrounded by toroidal tanks as in the LUNIK vehicles. The stage appears large enough to hold guidance components and a retro system. The numerous protruberances, access panels, and apparent ports have not been identified.

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 7

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
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
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T-62 MEDIUM TANK



NEW ANTI-TANK MISSILE

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Manufacturing techniques and construction features appear different from those of SKEAN and SASIN displayed in last November's parade; they more closely resemble those used in the older SCUD, SHYSTER, and SANDAL missiles.

The vehicle's estimated characteristics have compared to those of the SS-7, SS-8, SS-9, SS-10 and the new space booster first flown in mid-1964. The SS-7 and SS-9 were eliminated by the incompatibility of the ratio of the first-to-second stage propellant loading and the number of first stage engines. The SS-8 and SS-10 are possible contenders on the basis of the approximate first stage diameter, the ratio of first-to-second stage propellant loading, and the number of first stage engines.

The vehicle could have a gross take-off weight of about 350,000 pounds and a first stage thrust from 550,000 to 650,000 pounds. Using conservative construction factors, the dry weight, including payload, would be less than 45,000 pounds, which is within the 60,000-lb load-carrying capability assessed for the transporter.

#### New Antitank Missile

Analysis of the new antitank missile is still under way. It is about two feet long and some four inches in diameter. It probably weighs about 15 to 20 pounds and has a maximum range of around 1,000 meters. Six of them are mounted on a modified BRDM (light, amphibious, reconnaissance vehicle). The cover on the rear of the BRDM is raised by a center post to a height of two to three feet, and the missile launchers are mounted under the cover -- three on each side of the centerpost. The guidance mode of the missile is unknown, but it may be by radio. The missile has a sphere-cone shaped nose similar

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 8

**SECRET**

25X1

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25X1

to SNAPPER's, but its fins are similar to SWATTER's.

#### T-62 Medium Tank

The T-62 tank has been known to exist for several years, but this was its first public display. It is a medium tank, weighs about 40.5 short tons, and mounts a 115-mm smoothbore gun that fires either a hypervelocity armor piercing discarding sabot round or a high explosive antitank (HEAT) round. The T-62 is only 7.9 feet high and has a cruising range of about 310 miles with auxiliary tanks. It is the most modern tank in use by the Soviet Army today; however, at a reception after the parade Marshal Romistov, Chief Marshal of Armored Troops, stated that "some thought and work is under way on a new medium tank to replace all tanks."

Military equipment in the parade appeared in the following order.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
44	BRDM (Reconnaissance Vehicle)	8	250-mm Rocket Launchers
8	U/I Anti-Tank Missile	8	GOAs
16	SWATTER Anti-Tank Missile	16	GUIDELINES
42	BTR-60 (Wheeled, Armored Personnel Carrier)	16	GUILD
51	BTR-50 (Tracked, Armored Personnel carrier)	2	GALOSH
66	UAZ-69 (Light truck)	4	FROG-4
50	ASU-85 (Assault Gun)	4	FROG-3
88	T54/55 Medium tank	8	SCUD-A
21	T62 Medium tank	8	SCUD-B
21	ZSU 57-2 (Tracked Twin 57-mm AAA)	6	SHADDOCK
8	GANEF	2	SERB
16	100-mm Field Gun	4	SHYSTER
16	130-mm Field Gun	4	SANDAL

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 9

SECRET

25X1

**SECRET**

25X1

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
16	152-mm Gun-Howitzer	4	SKEAN
3	203-mm Gun-Howitzer	2	U/I SCUD like missile on tracked vehicle
8	40 Round Rocket Launcher	2	SASIN
8	200-mm Rocket Launcher	2	U/I 65 ft 3 stage solid propellant missile
		2	U/I 115 ft 3 stage liquid propellant missile

The GANEF was grouped with the armored units, directly behind the ZSU 57/2 twin 57-AA guns. When it was first displayed on 1 May 64, the GANEF was grouped with the surface-to-air missiles; however, on 7 Nov 64 it was exhibited with the tactical ballistic missile (SCUD).

The new track-mounted missile was positioned between the 2,200-nm SKEAN and the 6,000-nm SASIN. At a reception following the parade Marshal Krylov, Commander in Chief of Strategic-Rocket Troops, insisted to the [redacted] that the track mounted missile had a range of "4,000 plus kilometers" (about 2,200 nautical miles) and that this had been made possible by "a solid-fuel breakthrough." [redacted]

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SOURCE: VARIOUS

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 10

**SECRET**

25X1

**SECRET**

25X1

Soviet Cruiser Enters the Mediterranean

The Soviet KIROV-class heavy cruiser SLAVA has left the Black Sea, probably to direct the activities of the eight other surface ships and as many as three submarines now in the central Mediterranean; surveillance of a forthcoming [redacted] may also be planned.

SLAVA, whose class dates back to 1938, was flying a one-star command flag when she transited the Bosphorus on 13 May. The presence of a command element on board, plus her limited capability (compared with the more modern SVERDLOV- and CHAPAYEV-class cruisers) indicates that she may act as a tactical command ship for the growing number of units exercising in the Mediterranean. SLAVA will have an opportunity to direct the surveillance of Allied forces when exercise FAIR GAME III -- a

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SOURCE: VARIOUS

Congo (B) Delegation Visits Moscow

Ambroise Noumazalay, First Secretary of the Congo (B)'s governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and a representative of youth and students on the MNR Central Committee, is heading a delegation which left for Moscow on 28 April. The trip, the first to be made outside the Congo by an official party delegation, was described by official sources as an initial contact with a "brother" country.

Noumazalay's visit is of unusual interest because he is one of the brains among militant extremists in the MNR and because his influence in the party and on government policy is greater than his official titles would suggest. There are persistent rumors that he will replace Prime Minister Lissouba whenever the extremists decide to eliminate the last of the nonmilitants.

SOURCE: EMB BRAZZAVILLE A-294 (C)

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 11

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Possible Creation of Paramilitary Forces in Congo (L)

Congolese President Kasavubu has reportedly signed a decree authorizing the establishment of industrial police. Although the text has not been released, Premier Tshombe is said to have authorized private concerns to import arms and to have ordered that foreign exchange be made available. A quantity of automatic rifles, pistols, grenades, and a few machine guns are supposedly already en route, and the firms expect to import vehicles and adapt them locally to dual military and commercial use.

A former Belgian paratrooper has told the US Embassy in Brussels that a group of private individuals has convinced Tshombe that training centers must be set up in the Congo as part of the pacification effort. The idea is to create local militias which could relieve the Congolese National Army of responsibility for maintaining order in critical areas. The paratrooper claims that Belgium's top military adviser in the Congo, Col Vanderwalle, approves of the scheme and that Belgian military reservists working under Vanderwalle would provide the instruction. The source asked the Embassy whether the US could support the project by helping to finance salary payments to instructors. He estimated that \$60 thousand annually would be needed.

[REDACTED]

SOURCE: EMB LEOPOLDVILLE 3741 (C); EMB BRUSSELS 2155 (C)

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 13

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25X1

AAPSO Conference Concentrated Attacks on US

The US bore the brunt of attacks by delegates to the Communist-dominated Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference (AAPSO) meeting, which wound up its meetings in Ghana on 16 May.

The overwhelmingly anti-US tirades largely derived from efforts, strongly supported by Accra, to avoid Sino-Soviet clashes and from Ghanaian pressures on African radicals to soft pedal attacks on their governments in order not to jeopardize attendance at the Organization of African Unity's "summit" conference scheduled to be held in Accra this September. Thus, the one major theme acceptable to the Ghanaian Government and most of the delegates was the "wickedness" of the US, which was accused of every crime.

Sino-Soviet wrangling was kept to a minimum at public sessions, but was reportedly intense in committee meetings. Tight security was maintained on committee proceedings, particularly those considering applications for membership in AAPSO. Disputes were most acrimonious over the admittance of a Malaysian group, which was strongly opposed by Indonesia backed up by Communist China and North Korea. Latin America figured prominently in public speeches, and the expansion of AAPSO to include that area received strong support, although only Venezuela and Cuba were represented by observers. The Cuban delegation's proposal that the fifth conference be held in Havana next year reportedly was accepted. [REDACTED]

SOURCE: EMB ACCRA 1033 (C); 1034 (C); 1035 (U); 1041 (C); 1042 (C); 1044 (C); [REDACTED]

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 14

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Arab Relations With West Germany

Nine Arab states have broken with West Germany since Bonn and Tel Aviv officially established diplomatic relations on 13 May. Iraq jumped the gun on the 12th and was followed by the UAR, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria the next day and by Sudan on the 16th. The breaks are, however, not complete. Most if not all of these countries are expected to maintain some cultural and economic ties with West Germany, and some may reestablish their embassies within months.

The UAR has decided to postpone full recognition of East Germany, allegedly because it must consult Iraq, Algeria, and Yemen. Cairo still wants, however, to receive West German technical and economic aid and does not want to shut the door to the West completely. In this general connection, the Egyptians, while critical of US actions in Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic, are becoming convinced that the US is not a "paper tiger," and Nasser remains hopeful of good relations with and economic support from the US.

[REDACTED]

SOURCE: EMB CAIRO 503, 3984, AND 3999 (C)

Soviet Surface-to-Air Missile Equipment Reaches Algeria

The Soviet cargo ship IRKUTSK on 14 May unloaded in Algiers two canvas-covered trailers which strongly resemble the antenna trailer of the FAN SONG fire-control radar associated with the SA-2/GUIDELINE surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. Other military vehicles were also delivered.

An earlier report had indicated that the some 260 Algerian officer candidates who had left for training in the USSR on 12 March would take a one- or two-year SAM training course. Other reports have it that Soviet and Bulgarian technicians were recently studying the feasibility of building a SAM site at Ouargla, about 350 miles southeast of Algiers.

[REDACTED]

SOURCE: ALUSNA ALGERIA 13154Z (S)

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 15

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Pakistani Air Force Authorized To Challenge Indian Overflights

Authorization recently given the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) to challenge Indian overflights of its territory could lead to even worse relations between Karachi and New Delhi.

The PAF, which had earlier been forbidden to interfere with Indian overflights, has now been instructed to take whatever action may be necessary to deter such violations. Earlier, when an Indian Air Force (IAF) CANBERRA bomber flew for 44 minutes over Pakistani Army positions southeast of Lahore on 12 May, President Ayub personally ordered the PAF not to force it down in order to avoid prejudicing delicate cease-fire negotiations.

A senior PAF officer told the Assistant US Air Attache in Karachi that the IAF had flown reconnaissance missions over Pakistan from 12 to 15 May and flatly denied that his service had conducted similar flights over India. An Indian Government official, on the other hand, says that New Delhi protested to Pakistan on 10 and 11 May over 13 PAF violations of Indian airspace and that there had been "more in the eastern sector" since then. [REDACTED]

SOURCE: EMB KARACHI 2198 (C) AND 2202 (S); EMB NEW DELHI 3310 (S); STATE TO KARACHI 1305 (S)

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 18

**SECRET** [REDACTED]

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Sabotage of Libyan Oil Wells

Damage to five oil wells near Libya's border with Egypt was the work of saboteurs. Oil company representatives say that the caps were blown off each well and that this would require a considerable degree of expertise. Fires were reported raging in four of the wells.

The apparent sabotage may have been done by Egyptians or have been Egyptian-directed. The Libyan Government's pro-West stand previously has come under Egyptian fire and Libya's refusal to follow Nasser's policy regarding West Germany has heightened the already existing tension between the two countries. Egypt is also aroused over the Libyan Government's manipulation of last week's parliamentary elections in which anti-Western and pro-Nasser candidates were defeated. Cairo resumed anti-Libyan broadcasts immediately following the elections. Egyptian agitators in Libya are reportedly attempting to prod disgruntled elements into demonstrations against the government.

British petroleum representatives say that aircraft bearing Egyptian markings were observed flying alleged reconnaissance missions over the Concession 65 region about a month ago. This is a British-American oil concession, some 90 miles from the UAR border, where five oil wells were expertly sabotaged on 14 May.

SOURCE: EMB TRIPOLI 1014 (S) AND 1019 (C); PRESS

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 20

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**SECRET** [REDACTED]Cyprus Developments

The cautious optimism raised by the Greek and Turkish decision to negotiate over Cyprus is offset by Athens' persistent problems with President Makarios.

The Greeks expect Makarios to sabotage any agreement to which he is not a party on independence for Cyprus or a union with Greece that would involve meaningful territorial or other concessions by Nicosia. Makarios asserted in a 16 May speech that "enosis with Mother Greece" must be "pure" and "without exchanges." There is, however, no indication that he is planning to abandon his peace offensive, and the island is quiet.

Greek Foreign Minister Costopoulos and Turkish Foreign Minister Isik were encouraged by their talks in London, but they both realize the great differences between their points of view. Costopoulos hopes for calm on the island, and Isik is more confident that the Greeks really want to negotiate. The two ministers agreed on procedures whereby possibilities for a final solution will be explored in Ankara through the new Greek Ambassador. Discussions are to begin at the end of the month, and a "third party" -- an individual or a committee -- will be requested to give advice on sticky points. The still unnamed "third party" will not act directly under UN or NATO auspices. [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED] (S); EMB NICOSIA 1297 (S);

**SECRET** [REDACTED]

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**SECRET****NOTES**

DAHOMY: Rumors are now circulating in Cotonou that the government's overthrow is imminent. Prime Minister Ahomadegbe seems likely to be aware of the reports, although he has recently seemed unconcerned. He did not hold a scheduled 15 May meeting with Niger's President Diori on the northern border, possibly because of the rumors; difficulty with the official air force aircraft was the reason given.

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SUDAN: Government employees who belong to a southern political group -- except those in the army, police, and medical services -- will begin a two-day strike on 17 May to emphasize demands for "southernization" of administration in the south and to protest alleged army atrocities there.

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
17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin


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
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USSR: The matter-of-fact treatment of Stalin just before and during the 9 May celebrations has brought rumors in Moscow that the de-Stalinization issue is still causing problems for the leadership. An East European deemphasized the validity of the rumors, however, and claims that all the reminiscing over the war made it essential to mention Stalin.


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
GHANA/USSR: Ghana's recent invitation to Soviet Premier Kosygin to visit Accra merely renews an outstanding invitation to former Premier Khrushchev, according to a Foreign Office official. No date has been set for Kosygin's visit, and Accra does not expect it to occur soon.

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YUGOSLAVIA/USSR: A small Yugoslav naval force has left Split for a 10-day visit to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The force is headed by Adriatic Fleet Commander Vice Adm Ljubo Truta and consists of the training ship GALEB and two destroyers. The purpose of the cruise is to return the visit of the Soviet SVERDLOV-class cruiser MIKHAIL KUTUZOV and two KASHIN-class guided-missile destroyers which visited Split and Dubrovnik last June.


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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page 25

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FAR EAST/ASIA SECTION

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page F-1

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Recent Communist Activities in South Viet-Nam

Preliminary reports indicate that the Viet Cong initiated about 480 incidents during the week ending 15 May, 11 of which were armed attacks.

The largest assault was the one on 10 May against Song Be and its airfield by an estimated three Viet Cong battalions. On the 15th, a 16-vehicle Vietnamese convoy of one company and an armored car platoon was ambushed 35 miles north-east of Saigon and suffered almost complete destruction. Only two trucks and 54 Vietnamese escaped; two US advisers were killed.

The number of incidents was lower than the 530 recorded for the week ending 8 May, but the intensity of military and terrorist activity continued to rise. Most actions took place in the Mekong Delta provinces and in the Hop Tac Zone surrounding Saigon.

Viet Cong operations gave no indications as to where the Communists might begin a major campaign during the coming weeks. [REDACTED]

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**SOURCE:** VARIOUS

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page F-2

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Vietnamese Government May Face New Trouble From the Military

The South Vietnamese Government may be in for a new round of difficulties with the military, specifically the navy for the moment.

On 13 May, Armed Forces Chief Gen Tran Van Minh reportedly directed that the four navy unit commanders who led the rebellion against Adm Cang be brought to the Joint General Staff for disciplinary action. Later, however, Minh, Gen Thieu, and the Secretary of State to the Premier telephoned the new navy head -- Capt Phan -- and countermanded the directive. Phan has not, however, rescinded his order naming four new unit commanders, and rumors of another revolt are now being heard.

Minh has placed himself in an awkward position by revoking his own instructions, a development which could be exploited by those who wish to see him out of office.

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page F-4

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25X1 Reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam

25X1 United States aircraft reconnoitered routes in North Viet-Nam south of the 20th parallel both by visual and photographic means in the period [redacted]. The coverage of vehicular traffic and the condition of roads, railroads and bridges was highly successful.

The reconnaissance flights, each with two aircraft, encountered moderate to intense flak. One flight had radar contact with MIGs and pursued them toward Hainan Island but visual contact was not established.

25X1 A tabulation of both visual and photographic sightings for the period [redacted] follows:  
 86 railroad cars, 112 trucks, 13 unidentified vehicles, four bridges under repair, 15 barracks and 25 other buildings, one PT boat, five junks, 48 barges and 12 other small craft, a new radar site, one ferry in operation, five vehicles on or near roads at night, five storage silos, and construction activity along Route 15. Several sites along some routes appear to be military supply areas. A ford with new approaches was observed next to a destroyed bridge.

25X1 During the afternoon and evening [redacted]  
 25X1 [redacted] numerous flights completed their missions and reported the following: 21 trucks, seven railroad cars, nine probable armored vehicles and 12 other vehicles, one ferry previously hit but currently in use and two other ferries in use, 62 barges, about 20 boats (50 to 80 feet long), and one possible subchaser. The runway of Dong Hoi airfield has been repaired by using matting, and construction was noted at the west end of the runway. A small propeller-driven aircraft was observed at Thanh Hoi Airfield. At Vinh, five possible military surface craft were in line abeam in the river, and intense flak was noticed over the Vinh Airfield.

25X1 No hostile fighter reaction could be equated to these missions and there were no visual sightings of enemy aircraft. All aircraft had returned to their bases [redacted] with two damaged by ground fire.

SOURCE: VARIOUS

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page F-6

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More MIG's at North Viet-Nam Phuc Yen Airfield

25X1 Field readout of high-altitude photographs [ ]  
25X1 [ ] indicates that there are 60 MIG-15/FAGOTs or  
MIG-17/FRESCOs at Phuc Yen Airfield and four "pro-  
bably MIG dummy aircraft" at Haiphong's Cat Bi  
Airfield. No change in the state of construction  
at the Hanoi SAM sites was noted.

The reconnaissance aircraft that overflew  
Phuc Yen that day made two successive passes 50  
minutes apart. The first run found 56 MIGs there;  
on the second, four more were noted with fuel  
trucks alongside, which suggests that they had  
just landed.

The photographic coverage of Cat Bi airfield  
revealed the "dummy" MIGs in four newly constructed  
revetments on the taxiway east-southeast of the  
runway. The four alert revetments at the east end  
of the runway, where MIGs had been seen on earlier  
missions, were empty.

25X1 Whether the four MIGs observed at Cat Bi earlier  
are permanently stationed there or deployed from Phuc  
Yen temporarily is not known. [ ]

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page F-7

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Viet Cong Use Modern Fragmentation Mine

A directional fragmentation mine recently captured from the Viet Cong is somewhat similar to the US CLAYMORE type.

The DH-10 (Vietnamese designation) has a diameter of 11 3/4 inches, is 2 1/8 inches thick, and weighs about 20 pounds. The front is a fragmentation face containing 420 to 450 half-inch steel fragments embedded in a matrix. This face is concave and backed by about nine pounds of cast TNT. The mine is apparently designed for manual electrical control and has a set of folding legs which enables it to be placed on all types of surfaces and aimed in any direction. The DH-10 is primarily an antipersonnel weapon, but it has some effectiveness against light vehicles.

The use of directional fragments is a recent development in land mines, and possession of such a modern model could indicate that the guerrillas are receiving outside technical assistance in their construction. The materials employed are available to the Viet Cong. [REDACTED]

SOURCE: VARIOUS

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page F-9

**SECRET** [REDACTED]

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Japanese Labor Federation Reconsidering Aid to Hanoi

A leftist labor federation in Japan is reconsidering its plans to aid North Viet-Nam.

Leaders of the General Council for Trade Unions (SOHYO) began having second thoughts on sending medical supplies to Hanoi after some representatives argued that one-sided assistance would further confuse and divide the Japanese "peace movement." For the moment, however, plans to raise about \$4,200 remain unchanged.

The generally strong support for North Viet-Nam within SOHYO is evident in the attitude of the organization's secretary general. SOHYO can thus be expected to continue issuing pronouncements sympathetic to North Viet-Nam, especially when its high-level delegation attends the meeting of the pro-Communist World Federation of Trade Unions in Hanoi early next month.

SOURCE: EMB TOKYO 3708 (C)

Aftermath of South Korean Coup Plot

The recent threat of a coup in South Korea has been eliminated, according to Prime Minister Chong Il-kwon. Disclosure of the plot by the Army CIC Chief, probably in pursuit of presidential favor, upset the government's intention of keeping it secret until after President Pak's visit to the US.

Chong says that all persons involved were discontented colonels who are either under arrest or detained for questioning. On exception was a division commander who may have been arrested for not reporting knowledge of the intrigue.

Discovery of the plot has not visibly shaken the government, and hints that Prime Minister Chong was involved appear unfounded.

SOURCE: EMB SEOUL 1181 (C)

17 May 65


DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page F-10

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Military Developments in Laos

Air strikes of 12-14 May damaged Communist supply installations in northern Laos considerably. Most of the buildings at the Houei Houp installation -- a few miles inside Laos and only 20 miles from Dien Bien Phu in North Viet-Nam -- were destroyed or damaged; the bombings also triggered large secondary explosions among POL and ammunition stores there and caused an estimated 250 casualties including 150 killed. In the northeast, an air strike on the Ban Ban military areas reportedly resulted in heavy damage.

The Communists are still repairing Route 6 southwest of Sam Neua and have extended the trafficable portion to a point about 30 miles southwest of the town. A nearby supply and storage area may be associated with the road construction effort. The new road being built west of Sam Neua is apparently also being used.

T-28 pilots on 13 May saw many strategic villages and AAA positions along the route from Chavane east to the North Vietnamese border. They also spotted portage sites along the Se Kong River about 10 miles below what was earlier thought could be the southern terminus of an infiltration route via the river. These sightings tend to substantiate reports of a connection between the Se Kong and the route east from Chavane.

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SOURCE: VARIOUS

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page F-11

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Probable Power Shifts in Indonesia

Some realignment of Indonesia's power groupings may be in the offing, as more reports are received that First Deputy Premier Subandrio is in disfavor.

President Sukarno's disillusionment with Subandrio -- whose recent maneuverings have aided the Communists -- is becoming more apparent. A recent indication is that Defense Minister Gen Nasution's visit to Moscow early this month was reportedly to shore up Soviet-Indonesian relations which had been strained because of Subandrio's actions.

Ill feeling had arisen between Subandrio and Soviet Ambassador Mikhailov, who recently left Djakarta, allegedly because Subandrio had been misinforming Sukarno and bragging in Moscow that it was he -- not Sukarno -- who was running Indonesia. Subandrio had also said falsely that he had arranged an arms agreement during his July trip to Moscow, a claim which Nasution made good while there in September. In his farewell call, Ambassador Mikhailov reportedly told the Indonesian President that his First Deputy Premier was responsible for deteriorating relations between the two countries. Sukarno, therefore, sent Nasution, whom the Soviets hold in high regard, on the fence-mending mission.

Sukarno is said to be seeking a suitable replacement for Subandrio, whose actions have on occasion embarrassed him. The President will reportedly also retain Navy Chief Vice Adm Martadinata, whom Subandrio has wanted to oust. Recent rumors of Nasution's retirement may have been exaggerated; he did discuss his frustration as Defense Minister with Sukarno, but the latter reportedly requested him to remain at his post.

These latest events suggest that Sukarno is reverting to his old tactic of balancing power groupings after a prolonged period of bending to Subandrio's pressures.

SOURCE: ARMA DJAKARTA CX 65-65 (S)

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page F-12

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**SECRET** [REDACTED]Indonesian Deputy Premier Plans To Go to Tokyo

Indonesian President Sukarno is sending First Deputy Premier Subandrio on a five-day visit to Tokyo on 19 May in response to a personal appeal from Japanese Prime Minister Sato for a settlement of the Indonesian-Malaysian dispute.

Japanese Ambassador Saito in Djakarta says that Subandrio will convey Sukarno's regrets that he cannot confer with Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman in Tokyo; Subandrio will also claim that the President failed to see Rahman in Tokyo earlier this month because he objected to meeting the latter while he was there for a soccer meet as well as to Japanese magazine stories about Sukarno's Japanese wife.

Rahman has consistently expressed his willingness to talk with the Indonesian President since Japanese mediation efforts began recently. Sukarno's intentions, on the other hand, remain unknown although he appears to be leaving the door open for a sudden decision on discussions. Such a determination -- for or against -- could result from Djakarta's assessment of its need to improve its image before next month's Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers, of Malaysia's chances of attending and of the internal political atmosphere. [REDACTED]

SOURCE: EMB DJAKARTA 2483 (S)

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


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
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SUPPLEMENT

## ARAB MILITARY PLANNING

Current disputes in the Arab world, highlighted by the uproar over Tunisian President Bourguiba's suggestions for a solution of the Palestine question, have to date had no visible effect on military planning by the United Arab Command (UAC). North African states were never expected to provide major support to the UAC, and those countries most intimately involved in the feud with Israel -- the UAR, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia -- are apparently complying with UAC directives.

UAC planning is defensive in nature and is not expected to bear full fruit for some time. On the other hand, each UAC member is prepared to retaliate in kind against Israeli shelling of an Arab village or water-diversion project. Arab public opinion now seems to hold that the UAC may some day take the offensive against Israel. Responsible Arab leaders are, however, still believed intent on bringing together a force strong enough to gain a military stalemate with Israel in anticipation of international intervention which would then force a settlement favorable to the Arabs. The original concept of the UAC, which evolved after the January 1964 Arab heads-of-state meeting, has not changed. The Command is supposed to strengthen Arab forces to counter an expected Israeli offensive against Arab diversion of the Jordan River headwaters.

The following steps have already been taken to implement UAC plans: (1) Jordan has organized five new brigades which are expected to be operational this year; (2) air defense plans have been developed among Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria; (3) Lebanon has strengthened its forces near the Israeli border and is linking its border defenses with those of Syria; (4) the UAR has held maneuvers in the Sinai and may have augmented its forces there; (5) Iraq and Saudi Arabia have stockpiled materiel in Jordan and are prepared to send forces there in the event of war; (6) Iraq has earmarked two brigades -- one armored and one infantry -- for the UAC. Baghdad, even though preoccupied with the Kurdish conflict, is maintaining these units near its western border but they are not expected to be sent to Jordan as the UAC desired, primarily because of Amman's objections.

17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page (1)

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These steps, while fairly impressive, still do not provide the UAC with a force capable of challenging Israel. The UAC faces difficult logistic problems and could not, even at full strength, bring to bear against Israel as many troops as the 250,000 which Tel Aviv could mobilize in 48 hours.

The UAC has more bomber and fighter aircraft than Israel, but, as demonstrated during the 6 May parade in Tel Aviv, the latter can fly almost its entire active inventory of over 300 aircraft simultaneously. In addition, Israeli air defenses have been greatly improved by the acquisition of the HAWK surface-to-air missile system and new L-90 antiaircraft guns.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its President, Ahmed Shuqayri, are becoming more ambitious in their desire to play a leading role in Arab military planning, but it is doubtful that the UAC would consider diminishing its authority by granting an overriding position to the PLO's Liberation Army, the PLA. Syria, which has only superficially resigned itself to UAR domination of the UAC, seems to be giving the PLA a prominent role. The PLA so far has no independent life of its own, however, and the UAC can be expected to exert tight control over this relatively small component of its over-all force. The Arabs are generally concerned over Shuqayri's flirtation with the Chinese Communists. Jordan opposes Shuqayri's aspirations which could threaten its control of the West Bank, and the UAR itself is still smarting over Shuqayri's recent attempt to gain domination of the Arab League over the Bourguiba issue. [REDACTED]

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17 May 65

DIA Intelligence Bulletin

Page (2)

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